The transmission of information is crucial for productivity and growth. However, language differences may limit its effectiveness. This is particularly relevant for knowledge platforms that aim to be global, given the cultural diversity of the pool of users. In this paper, I empirically investigate how the exogenous cost of language affects communication quality and the trade-offs faced by knowledge platforms in implementing their website in multiple languages. I exploit the staggered introduction of websites for languages other than English on a question-and-answer platform to demonstrate two main facts. First, non-native English speakers who contribute in English increase their answers' quality once able to use their native language, and their answers are more likely to solve the questioner's problem. The native-language answers drive the effect, which is larger when the question quality is higher and the incentives are stronger. Second, users who participate in their native language but not in English contribute lower-quality answers compared to those who contribute in English. This suggests that lower language barriers allow users with less expertise in the subject to participate. These results show that the platform should adopt multiple languages to maximise the quality of the information collected, although doing so may also result in an inflow of low-quality content from new users.

In many organisations, employees' learning and productivity rely on knowledge platforms' user-generated content, which has become a standard daily source of information for various tasks. As users contribute on a voluntary basis, platforms need to incentivise free effort. With data from Stack Exchange, I investigate whether users provide more and better quality contributions when endowed with more control over actions. Using a dynamic discrete choice model, I show that autonomy has positive marginal value that is heterogeneous across different types of users. I simulate counterfactuals with different designs. The results show that the platform would lose an important share of production and quality of content in the absence of delegation. When delegation is based on performance, the platform faces a trade-off, which depends on the composition of the community, and the tasks that the platform wants to incentivise.

Firms' production depends on effective information flows across the organisation, and hierarchies play a crucial role in shaping them. Nevertheless, there is little empirical evidence on how information moves across hierarchies. In this paper, I exploit a unique panel dataset of emails from the Enron Corporation to explain the role of vertical communication in information flows. I find that vertical communication was meant to either move information up the hierarchy or delegate tasks down, suggesting that subordinates were generally in charge of information acquisition, whereas superiors retained decision rights. In addition, emails are more precise when directed to superiors rather than when sent to subordinates, suggesting an uneven distribution of power in favour of superiors or effective incentives. This evidence supports the incentive-theory perspective on communication. However, an event study around the sudden resignation of the CEO shows that superiors gain a more important role in providing information in moments of crisis. This result suggests that higher-ranked roles hold more complex knowledge and help subordinates in challenging times, consistent with the knowledge-based view of hierarchies. Finally, I find that higher-ranked employees have broader languages, particularly when providing information, suggesting broader communication across the firm. Overall, the paper provides real-data evidence that incentive theories and team theories may complement each other in explaining the communication flows within firms.

A sizable literature on reputational cheap-talk suggests that professional advisors may confirm the common priors regardless of their true opinion, so as to appear "smart" and thereby increase the future demand for advice. We run an experiment to investigate whether- and to which extent confirming the common priors helps increasing demand for advice and whether- and how the answer depends on adviser market power.